Kosovo in the Serbian Presidential Elections

With all due respect to the legitimate political and human ambitions of the Liberal-Democratic Party leader Cedomir Jovanovic and the DSS-NS candidate Velimir Ilic, the real battle in the Serbian presidential elections will take place between current President Tadic and the most influential leader of the opposition - Nikolic, with a special focus on their political positions in the light of a rather probable application of the Albanian-American model for the Kosovo crisis resolution, i.e. unilateral proclamation of independence followed by US recognition.

At first sight, it looks like Tadic and Nikolic do not have conflicting views on the Kosovo issue. The Radicals' support for government's anti-independence policy which has lately been consistently advocated by the President of Serbia, Boris Tadic, together with the President of Serbian Government,  Kostunica, slightly relieved and put aside the spirit of perpetual conflicts in the relation DS - SRS. Still, regardless of the visible and repeatedly confirmed consensus of leading Serbian parties on the Kosovo issue, there is a deep difference between ideological positions of SRS and DS that will, both directly and indirectly, reflect on the course and outcome of presidential elections, the more so if it were conducted in the shadow of Kosovo's (self-proclaimed) independence.  

Ideologically, politically and value-wise, the Democratic Party of Boris Tadic presents itself as a promoter of intrinsic political, economic and social reforms and as the loudest advocate of Serbia's urgent Euro-Atlantic integrations, which has now been seriously destabilized by the attitude of the EU and the NATO when it comes to the resolution of Kosovo's status.

As the President of Serbia, at the moment of possible proclamation of Kosovo's independence and its recognition by the U.S.A and the EU, Tadic will, according to the Serbian Constitution, have to at least send a strong protest note to the West. He will be obliged to a strong response not only by his previous state policy, but also by the preferences of large portion of voters of his party (according to the findings of Politicum Agency's research, as many as about 55 per cent of DS followers favor Kosovo over European integrations). Thus, any sort of quick and unexpected deviation from the current state policy relating to Kosovo and enhancement of the spirit of Euro-Atlantic values would not only represent an unambiguous inconsistency, but also a unique political salto mortale, both concerning the mentioned preferences of his followers and his political partnership with Prime Minister Kostunica, who holds clearly strong positions against Kosovo's independence.     

To make things even more delicate, Tadic's confrontation with Western policy on Kosovo would aggravate his good personal relations with the U.S.A. and the EU. In addition, potential anti-western deviation of his DS would have internal political consequences and open the possibilities for LDP to gain political profit from such forced and instant anti-west rhetoric of the DS leader.    

Nevertheless, western support to Albanians' request for independence puts the main promoter and agent of reforms in Serbia into very difficult political and promotional position, as the division between pro-western, reform-oriented forces on one side and anti-western and conservative forces on the other - becomes increasingly obsolete.

This realistic and serious problem for Tadic plays into the hands of his main opponent. Essentially, recognition of Kosovo's independence by the EU and the U.S.A. easily fits into Radicals' picture of Serbian historical and political reality where the conflict of Serbia with western world as a whole dominates.

The announced western support for Kosovo Albanians in their separatist aspirations opens the possibility for perpetuating the old Radical conspiracy theory against the Serbs and for strengthening of ideological thesis of anti-European course of Serbia, with an unavoidable addition of Russophilia. In the presidential race, Nikolic can be convincing in enhancing anti-western attitude as a gesture of resistance and protest due to Kosovos' independence, while the story about the EU can easily be presented as something opposed to the interests of Serbia, if it came out that the EU had advocated and stood for Kosovo's independence.    

The Democrats' promotional matrix - the everlasting division between reformists and anti-reformists - will lose its bargaining power, especially faced to traditional Radical demagogy. If we add that the electoral body of Radicals is disciplined and numerous and that they can find pick up votes among former supporters of Socialists and of Milosevic-era tycoon Bogoljub Karic, it becomes obvious that chances of Tomislav Nikolic, in case of realization of the independence scenario, would be neither small nor unserious.

An act of unilateral recognition of Kosovo would also produce consequences on other stakeholders in the presidential race. Within the coalition DSS - NS, the degree of resistance to American policy in the Balkans would increase and so would the number of pro-Russian political orientation followers. Further weakening of their already weak Euro-Atlantic enthusiasm would make their support to pro-European oriented Tadic in the second run of presidential election even more difficult. And that support is, considering all relevant factors, one of major preconditions of his triumph over Nikolic.    

To conclude, Serbian presidential elections that would be conducted in the shadow of unilaterally proclaimed and western-recognized independence of Kosovo could be a landmark turning point on the Serbian political scene. Namely, reform processes and Serbia's accession to the EU and NATO would in such case come in direct conflict with the vital state interest of preserving territorial integrity and constitutional and legal sovereignty. In such circumstances, there is considerable possibility of a return to power of SRS, which would further jeopardize global and western interests in the region.  

The author is an associate of the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade.

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