Ahtisaari's Doomed Proposal
Lessons from UN envoy’s failed “supervised independence”plan
| Failures of Ahtisaari’s plan | Lesssons learned |
| Against the will of a sovereign, democratic state | Must respect UN Charter, UN Resolution 1244, 1975 Helsinki Final Act on non-violability of borders, 1992 Badinter Commission (no new states within former Yugoslav republics) |
| Solution tacitly predetermined from the start | No predetermined solutions, otherwise favored side has no incentive to negotiate |
| Limitation of discussion options | Open, unhindered talks. |
| Time limits | No deadlines. Talks continue until agreement is reached. |
| Controversial choice of mediator | Balanced international team of moderators with no direct interest |
| Legitimizes post-war discrimination of minorities | Guarantees for return, safe movement and discrimination reversal. No declarative nor cosmetic human rights policy. |
| Unwillingness to consider the interests of Belgrade | Belgrade and regional interests must be considered |
| Lack of true compromise | Force both sides to give up something rather than imposing one side's interests over another |
| Unique case, not a precedent | Kosovo is very similar to dozens of other hotspots. Solution must comply with comparable cases in past or future. |
| Provides Kosovo with prerogatives of a state: constitution, border and air traffic control, army, secret services… | Restrain controversial state-building prerogatives |
| NATO troops beyond any civilian control | Reasonable liability and civic control of the international peacekeeping force |
| Decentralization: small number of Serbian municipalities | Larger number of horizontally connected Serbian municipalities with possible vertical links with Belgrade |
| Pristina retains key control over decision making and relations of K/Serbs with Belgrade , including aid money and nominations of police commanders in Serb areas | Maximum self-governance of K/Serbs inside Kosovo and maximum autonomy for K/Albanians within Serbia. Possibility of special relations with neighboring states |
| Possibility of readjusting municipal borders after 2008 census | Pre-war census and cadastre records must be taken into account |
| Privatization process doesn't take into account nor indemnify Serbia nor Serbian workers | Review entire privatization controversy |
| No restitution of state, social or church property | All property must be restored to its rightful owner, unless otherwise agreed |
| Protected zones guarded by Kosovo police | Serbian heritage sites and enclaves must be protected by responsible military forces, international or Serbian |
Kosovo's foreign debt is calculated on the principle of successor entities of the former Yugoslavia | Kosovo is not a successor entity of Yugoslavia , Belgrade and Pristina should agree on debt |
| Controversial aspects hushed up between the lines | No confusing phraseology subject to multiple interpretation |
| Cosmetic upgrades to rejected proposals | Meaningful adjustments in case of stalemate |
| Proposed solution leads to further Balkan instability and away from EU integration | A true solution must pacify and accelerate EU integration of Western Balkans |
