THE CONTROVERSIAL RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO’S SECESSION AND THE UNCONVINCING RHETORIC OF LABELLING IT A “UNIQUE” CASE HAVE BACKFIRED EARLIER THAN EXPECTED.

The Warnings

“Separatist regions like the Basque country or Abkhazia might not resemble Kosovo right now – as Washington is quick to note – but by explicitly stating the merits of Kosovar self-determination and independence, Washington is essentially creating an innovative code, only to make the cipher publicly available. Current and future separatists merely have to manufacture the same conditions and sequenc- ing that have compelled the West to embrace an independence Kosovo: terrorize locals, upset government crackdowns, incite a rebellion and lure in foreign intervention and commitment to rebuild. Once militants get this far, Kosovo will no longer be unique – even by Washington’s peculiar standards – and areas that share Kosovos characteristics will be equally deserving of independence.”

- David Young, Christian Science Monitor

“Whatever trickery the West uses to override UN Security Council Resolution 1244 – which kept Kosovo in Serbia – the proclamation of the new state will have inculcable long-term consequences: on secessionist movements from Belgium to the Black Sea via Bosnia, on relations with China and Russia, and on the international system as a whole.”

- John Laughland, The Guardian

“Kosovo: Coming soon to a theater near you.”

- Michailis Firillas, Haaretz, Israel

“Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s claim that “Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any other situation in the world today” misses the point. It is doubtful that separatists from Xejiang to Catalonia will accept the niceties of Rice’s argument that Kosovo is exceptional due to its political and legal history. It is much more likely that these separatists will view the conflict for the precedent that it is; the cutting off of a sovereign state’s territory in favor of an ethnic and religious minority threatening violence – a model to be replicated elsewhere.”

- James E. Palmer, Detroit Free Press

“The EU and the US can write in a million documents that Kosovo is a unique case, the facts on the ground worldwide will prove that mantra to be a farce.”

- Vladimir Chizhov, Russian ambassador to the EU

“By recognizing the unilateral independence of Kosovo, a taboo will be broken ... All those who are favoring independence in the world will be encouraged by the fact that the only thing that remains to be done is to convince the USA and Europe that their fight is a just cause.”

- Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Foundation

“What Kosovo does is to set a precedent that suggests that in certain cases, there is a moral imperative that allows the often arbitrary lines of states to be redrawn. And this will be felt not only in Abkhazia, but in unrecognized territories and separatist movements across the world.”

- Shujun Walker, The Prospect

“The Kosovo precedent is a terrifying precedent. In essence, it is breaking open the entire system of international relations that have prevailed not just for decades, but for centuries. And it will undoubtedly bring on itself an entire chain of unforeseen consequences.”

- Vladimir Putin, Prime minister of Russia

“The ‘Kosovo precedent’ is a convoluted confirmation that the resolution of regional conflicts is not necessarily based on the principle of state’s territory integrity. The 17-year period of South Ossetia’s independence confirms its viability, we demands only the legitimation of our sovereignty in accordance with the charter of the United Nations.”

- Resolution of the Assembly of South Ossetia

“If Kosovo can be independent, so can Abkhazia.”

- Sergey Bagapsh, President of Abkhazia

“We are saying loud and clear that we have never planned to recognize Kosovo, nor do we plan to do so in the future. The solution for Kosovo was a hasty one.”

- Mikhail Saakashvili, President of Georgia

The Denial

The EU Council of ministers conclusions passing the way for the recognition of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia due to its “uniqueness”.

“The Council reiterates the EU’s adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, inter alia the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and all UN Security Council resolutions. It underlines its conviction that in view of the conflict of the 1990s and the extended period of international administration under SCR 1244, Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case which does not call into question these principles and resolutions.”

Press conference by former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke; French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and president of the Russian Duma Committee of Foreign Affairs Konstantin Kosachev on whether Kosovo is a precedent:

Holbrooke: “Russia has to adopt an identical position to those which have the US and the EU, that Kosovo is a unique case – there is no precedent!”

Kouchner: “Holbrooke is absolutely right. We did not have a choice ... when two communities cannot speak to each other, but they only speak through arms, there is no choice but to separate them!”

Kosachev: “You are absolutely wrong on Kosovo. It is a terrible precedent!”

The Aftermath

“Who will believe appeals to respect the territorial integrity of Georgia by those who only a few weeks without any shame destroyed the territorial integrity of Serbia when they recognized Kosovo?”

- Javier Ruperez, ABC Madrid

“The recognition of Kosovo was a foolhardy, poorly thought through policy which may reverberate violently all over the world for decades. This is not to defend Russian actions in Georgia but to show how the Americans, Brits and others want things both ways - and it also shows how the recognition of Kosovo has destroyed the hallowed concept that you don’t change borders through force.”

- Tim Marshall, Sky News

“Bush administration officials repeatedly stated that Kosovo was a unique case, apparently believing that they could define what Kosovo’s independence meant to others.”

- Paul J. Sanders, U.S. News and World Report

“The subjectivity of international factors in assessing the conditions on the ground, general inconsistency in respecting international law and the double-standards of the great powers were all crucial factors in the developments that led to Kosovo’s proclamation of independence. After Kosovo, we should expect other separatist movements – both outside and inside of Europe.”

- Oliver Ivanov, Serbian State Secretary for Kosovo and Metohija

“Kosovo rid the West of time and space for maneuver and political influence in Transcaucasia.”

- Regnum, Moscow

“It is impossible at the same time to recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia and repeat relentlessly that the territorial integrity of Georgia by those who only a few weeks without any shame destroyed the territorial integrity of Serbia in Kosovo, held better keep quiet about the territorial integrity of Georgia.”

- Dmitry Rogozin, Russian Ambassador to NATO

“The Kosovo case has become a nightmare. The new international law which the West wanted to create with this case has now turned against its authors and their interests.”

- Die Presse, Vienna
10 KEY RELATIONSHIPS FOR KOSOVO'S STABILITY

1) Pristina and Kosovo Serbs

What's at stake: Kosovo Serbs are rejecting Pristina's authority and are supporting Belgrade's state institutions. Without acceptance by Kosovo Serbs, there can be no full territorial integrity or sovereignity of Pristina.

Expected dynamic: Pristina's actions are likely to be too slow. It will not be able to win support by Belgrade's institutions, or any support for the Kosovo Serbs.

2) Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs

What's at stake: Belgrade has two strategic goals in Kosovo: it wants to preserve the Kosovo Serb community and guarantee its integrity over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Belgrade has shown that the UN Security Council is unlikely to accept the Kosovo Serbs as a separate entity.

Expected dynamic: Serbia will continue to support the Kosovo Serbs as long as there is no resolution of the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. Serbia's territorial integrity over Kosovo is not likely to be recognized by the international community.

3) Kosovo Serbs and EU

What's at stake: Kosovo Serbs have rejected the EU mission in Kosovo (Eulex) and have not recognized Kosovo's sovereignty. Pristina is unlikely to change its policy.

Expected dynamic: The EU has not yet defined a strategy for Kosovo Serbs. The EU will likely continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo.

4) EU and Belgrade

What's at stake: The EU is trying to negotiate a deal with Belgrade to recognize Kosovo. However, Belgrade is not willing to recognize Kosovo and is likely to continue to support Pristina.

Expected dynamic: Despite the EU's efforts, it is unlikely that Belgrade will recognize Kosovo. The EU will likely continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo.

5) EU countries which do and those which do not recognize Kosovo

What's at stake: The EU's position on Kosovo is divided. Some EU countries recognize Kosovo, while others do not. This division is likely to continue.

Expected dynamic: The EU countries which recognize Kosovo will likely continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo. The EU countries which do not recognize Kosovo will likely continue to support Belgrade's authority in Kosovo.

6) Pristina and EU

What's at stake: The implementation of the Pristina plan, at least in the Albanian-dominated areas of Kosovo. Pristina has提出的 a compromise plan which is likely to be rejected by Belgrade.

Expected dynamic: The Pristina plan is likely to be rejected by Belgrade. Pristina is unlikely to change its policy.

What's at stake: The Kosovo compromise project aims to find a solution to the Kosovo crisis. The project is likely to fail, as Pristina and Belgrade are unlikely to accept each other's terms.

Expected dynamic: Despite the project's failure, Pristina and Belgrade are likely to continue to negotiate a solution to the Kosovo crisis.

7) Pristina and Moscow

What's at stake: Moscow's policy on Kosovo. Moscow has supported the Serb side in the Kosovo crisis, and is likely to continue to do so.

Expected dynamic: Moscow is likely to continue to support Belgrade's authority in Kosovo.

8) Belgrade and Moscow

What's at stake: The status of Kosovo. Moscow is likely to continue to support Belgrade's authority in Kosovo.

Expected dynamic: Moscow is likely to continue to support Belgrade's authority in Kosovo.

9) EU and UN

What's at stake: The UN's role in Kosovo. The UN is likely to continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo.

Expected dynamic: The UN is likely to continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo.

10) Washington and Pristina

What's at stake: Pristina's ambitions in Kosovo. Pristina is likely to continue to pursue its European integration.

Expected dynamic: Pristina is likely to continue to pursue its European integration.

What's at stake: Washington's policy on Kosovo. The US is likely to continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo.

Expected dynamic: The US is likely to continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo.

What's at stake: A common strategy aimed at ensuring Kosovo's recognition worldwide. The EU is likely to continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo.

Expected dynamic: The EU is likely to continue to support Pristina's authority in Kosovo.

What's at stake: The Kosovo Compromise Project. The project is likely to fail, as Pristina and Belgrade are unlikely to accept each other's terms.

Expected dynamic: Despite the project's failure, Pristina and Belgrade are likely to continue to negotiate a solution to the Kosovo crisis.
By attempting to bypass both international law and the United Nations, those international actors supporting Kosovo’s independence have contributed to the blurring of responsibilities and mandates of the international presence in Kosovo, underlining the very clarity and stability that independence intended to bring.

Confronted to those on-going disputes, the establishment of a Kosovo Serb Assembly and the entering into force of Kosovo’s Constitution on June 15th has further clouded the notion of empirical sovereignty in Kosovo. The international community’s communities failed to foresee and plan for such legal-political and technical obstacles to consolidating peace and stability in Kosovo, making further fragmentations and mandates’ ambiguity inevitable.

The deployment of the EU’s much heralded rule of law mission has been severely delayed due to uncertainty about the legal framework. Under Visser’s plan for an internationally supervised independent judiciary, EULEX – the EU’s largest casualty crisis management mission, conceived to train and monitor police, customs officials and judges – and the international civil office (ICO), established to supervise crisis management mission, conceived to delay the establishment of a Kosovo Serb Assembly, its mission is now inescapably tied to the rule of law sector between different organizations.

Within Visser’s proposal the reference to “international operational capabilities in the areas of international policing, hostage and customs throughout Kosovo” and the establishment of a Kosovo Serb Assembly is increasingly tenable given the growing reality of Kosovo’s de facto partition.

That such a blurring of roles and responsibility privilging of some realities over others is leading to the skein of roles and responsibilities within Kosovo has contributed to the disintegration of Kosovo’s public administration, institutions, a hardening of Kosovo’s de facto partition and a freezing of the current status.

Until the UN Security Council decides otherwise, Resolution 1244 remains in force. Combined with weak recognition in the region and an uncertain international environment within Kosovo has contributed to the disintegration of Kosovo’s public administration, institutions, a hardening of Kosovo’s de facto partition and a freezing of the current status.

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A Southern America’s Kosovos

In Ecuador, the mayor of Guayaquil, supported by the media and conserva-
tion pro-American policies, claimed in late 2007 a status of autonomy for his department. In Bolivia, a referendum on May 4, 2008 approved 89 percent of votes favoring the autonomy of Santa Cruz. In 2005, the government of Hojo Schaff was, however, able to ren- ein force its support 

In the Balkans, Kosovo is situated in the heart of an array of geopolitical challenges of primary importance: at the intersection of corridors VIII and X and close to the Balkans’ South Stream pipeline project and the Washington-sponsored plan for the AMERO pipeline on Corridor VII. In the last decade, Kosovo has some of Europe’s richest re-
vesses in coal, zinc, lead and lithium – estimated according to a World Bank report to $13 billion in gas reserves; the capital, Pristina in northwest Kosovo is neighbor-
ging the most important Lithium-American market (the state of Málaga-
co), it also covers important resources in silver-hydrates, which consists in the production of evaporated water, in addition to the important agricultural zone.

In the same manner, the construction of the road to themine in Ecuador in Uganda has in itself only a geo-strategic ex-
planation: to control the Colombian territory and the promise to make the region a strategic location. In the 1970s to the 1980s, the US have begun constructing the road of Boliche, which connect the capital of Ecuador, Quito, with the border of Colombia, to the east; in 1990s – is also found in Latin America. This is certainly not coincidental, since the US, at least, have been the main in place of Kosovo since the 1990s – has been in Uganda, which is promoting a "rumbos propio", which is promoting a "free territory".

SOUTH AMERICA’S KOSOVOS

THREE ANDINE STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA – ECUADOR, VENEZUELA AND BOLIVIA – HAVE BEEN FACED IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS TOUGH SUCCESSION ISSUES WITH GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORKS SIMILAR TO THE ONE IN KOSOVO. SINCE KOSOVO’S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THEIR PROBLEMS HAVE ONLY WORSENED.

In VENEZUELA, Colombia’s government has been trying to impose itself as the new regional leader, with the support of the United States, while the US have begun constructing the road of Boliche, which connect the capital of Ecuador, Quito, with the border of Colombia, to the east; in 1990s – has been in Uganda, which is promoting a "rumbos propio", which is promoting a "free territory".

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WHY THEY SAY “NO”

LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH RECOGNIZE KOSOVO

1. Afghanistan
2. Costa Rica
3. Albania
4. France
5. Turkey
6. United States of America
7. United Kingdom
8. Austria
9. Senegal
10. Latvia
11. Germany
12. Estonia
13. Italy
14. Denmark
15. Luxembourg
16. Peru
17. Belgium
18. Poland
19. Switzerland
20. Australia
21. Ireland
22. Sweden
23. Netherlands
24. Iceland
25. Slovenia
26. Finland
27. Japan
28. Canada
29. Bulgaria
30. Hungary
31. Croatia
32. Germany
33. Liechtenstein
34. South Korea
35. Monaco
36. Marshall Islands
37. Nauru
38. Burkina Faso
39. Lithuania
40. San Marino
41. Czech Republic
42. Liberia
43. Seychelles
44. Columbia
45. Balize

LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH DON’T RECOGNIZE KOSOVO

1. China
2. India
3. Sri Lanka
4. Vietnam
5. Indonesia
6. Singapore
7. Philippines
8. New Zealand
9. Iran
10. Uzbekistan
11. Pakistan
12. Tajikistan
13. Kyrgyzstan
14. Kazakhstan
15. Turkmenistan
16. Afghanistan
17. Ukraine
18. Hungary
19. Romania
20. Montenegro
21. Serbia
22. Russia
23. Bulgaria
24. Greece
25. Albania
26. North Macedonia
27. Kosovo
28. Turkey
29. Austria
30. Belgium
31. Sweden
32. Finland
33. Norway
34. Iceland
35. Estonia
36. Latvia
37. Lithuania
38. Lithuania
39. Latvia
40. Lithuania
41. Latvia
42. Lithuania
43. Latvia
44. Lithuania
45. Latvia

A list compiled by Joao Targino (Kosovo War Foundation) and Catherine Spreukels (Kosovo's International Community).
KOSOVO’S “INVISIBLE” GHETTOS

THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE HAS WORSENED THE ISOLATION OF THE KOSOVO SERBS. CONDEMNED TO THEIR “EN-CLAVES” SINCE 1999, THEIR FUTURE IN THE PROVINCE IS CONSIDERED WITH SERIOUS DOUBT.

They are applying a sticks and carrots policy on us. First they warn us, then they tax us. When we resist, they prison us. When we do not, they tax us again. I will also vote for change.

- Milovan Ilić

The invisible is by definition something impossible to be seen and therefore impossible to be noticed, either. That is why, impossible to be seen and therefore impossible to perceive, the invisible is by definition something beyond the reach of the senses. That is why, impossible to be seen and therefore impossible to perceive, the invisible is by definition something beyond the reach of the senses.

- Aleksandar Ćotrić

The Kosovo Serb population 1999

The Kosovo Serb population 2008

Phobia of the Albanians just after their unilateral declaration of independence. The war in Kosovo has taken another dimension: a psychological, demographic and a cultural one. The remaining of Orthodox religious places, four of which are on the UNESCO list of World Heritage, is taking place in the midst of total indifference of the international community only too ready, however, to take offense of Buddhist statues were attacked.

The invisible is by definition something beyond the reach of the senses. On the spot, the few doctors and nurses working in the clinics of the enclaves, emphasize the increase of nervous pathologies, especially among young children. Having no access to medicines, people suffering from chronic diseases or cancer cannot be treated. In the absence of anaesthetics, alcohol and cigarettes are there to erode the souls. In Bracarija, in the halls of former ski centre hotels, now turned into a displaced persons’ home, we meet pale, hollow-faced and skinny bodies supported by crutches.

The Red Cross of Serbia is the only body bringing some relief aids here, providing soap for the poorest. Here, a humanitarian and health drama is going on right under the noses of international NGOs which do not seem to care too much for it. In April this year, when Russia sent urgent food aid in several convoys to the enclaves, some people giggled maliciously, insinuating that the convoys were filled with ammunition and not rice.

And yet, the last Serbs remaining in Kosovo have not even strength to fight. Their ultimate fate is the foregone conclusion by Belgrade. The Belgrade will act because they think their nothing more to lose. But the young?

Marc Bay is a French reporter.
(N) EITHER EAST (N) OR WEST

ALTHOUGH A DOMINANT MAJORITY OF SERBS WANT TO JOIN THE EU, THEY ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT NATO AND THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY AGAINST THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSSOVO. THIS BECAME EVEN MORE COMPLICATED WITH KOSSOVO RECEIVING OPEN SUPPORT NOT ONLY FROM THE USA AND NATO, BUT ALSO FROM THE EU.

Kosovo and the rise of Serbia's "EURO-SKEPTICISM"

Serbia has today a new pro-EU government, a majority of its population is in favor of European integrations, but if Brussels and Washington pursue the policy of supporting Kosovo's secession and freezing Serbia into recognizing it, it should be no surprise if "EURO-SKEPTICISM" becomes a dominant feeling.

After the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000, EU membership appeared to the majority of Serbs as a goal without an alternative. This was due to the special relationship that some European politicians in the case of the downfall of Milosevic. No, Serbia did not opt for Europe because of money. It did so because it saw Europe as its natural surroundings, and almost all of us from the Serb intelligentsia werenost Westar

It seemed to us that, with the fall of Milosevic, the disagreements between Serbs and the West were forever resolved. It seemed to us that a seemingly ever-grown peaceful prosperity and prosperity with a head of democratic Serbia would stand shoulder to shoulder with its Western friends and would be united in marching towards a brighter future.

But it did not turn out that way. Although Serbs extruded to the Hague two of its presidents, a prime minister, a bunch of ministers, and the entire wartime chief of state, it was still unable to do anything but "fighting tooth and nail" with the "inside" and at the result, cannot even make the antechamber of the Euro-Atlantic Union.

Although Serbia had regained and strengthened democracy, as well as its state sovereignty. However, the problem is that no EU country has recognized Kosovo's state status, the so-called "Northern Cyprus". That is why Cyprus, which is fighting to become a member of the EU, is a new golden era for Serbia.

"Kosovo and the rise of Serbia's "EURO-SKEPTICISM""

The Serbian elite is not united in its view regarding Serbian foreign policy align- ment was its relation towards NATO, which was not supported by more than a quarter of the population. Still, it was supported by more than a quarter of the population. Still, it was supported by the Western capitals, and it is highly likely that the Serbian political elite as well as the electorate would in the near future again face the dilemma Kosovo or the EU – only with sharper differences.

Finally, to make the whole thing even more complicated, this foreign policy conflict also involves Russia which, by consistently opposing imposed solutions in the Security Council and upholding the principles of international law, managed to come forward as a factor insisting on preservation of the existing international order, and after it, returned to the Balkans as a relevant political actor.

By doing this, the Serbian political elite and public opinion were re-tested again; this time with another geopolitical constant. Russia once more entered here, whilst the other geopolitical constant, the example of Cyprus, which is fighting to become a member of the EU, is a new golden era for Serbia.

"Kosovo and the rise of Serbia's "EURO-SKEPTICISM"

We began to understand that there was something wrong with our friendship: it was clear that we had underestimated one friendship in a different way. Serbia is sentimentally but not so racist. And maybe, those who have heard tales about Belgrade and Pristina in such a way that Belgrade could not obtain anything and Pristina must obtain everything – are not our great friends after all.

The problem was that the conditions for Serbia's integration kept changing, much more than for other candidate countries.

After the EU referendum in December 2002, UK and French leaders clearly said that the next step for Serbia's entry into the EU would be recognizing the accession of Kosovo. Of course, this was an ideal option which does not exist in Brussels, but "Euro-rationalists" wait for the accession includes 35 chapters, and each of these can be blocked by any of the 27 EU members at their beginning or end. Crudely put, this amounts to 899 potential hurdles of blocking one's country's accession to the EU is thus of little importance if, in the near future, only Britain and France officially remove this additional condition to Serbia, it is not important either if the European Commission or all other institutions have a different view. It is enough to have one single EU country insisting on a non-additional condition and Serbia – if it maintains its own positive – will never be able to enter the EU.

In Serbia's case, some of the most im- portant countries of the EU have already recognized Kosovo's independence. This might not be a good reason to expect that Serbia would not face in the nearest future a demand for "resolving neighborly relations".

The second part of the elite is "Euro-skeptic". It is symbolized by the opposition from the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Serb Radical Party (SRS). The strategic goal of this group is to not wait for a situation in which, after years of talks with the EU, Serbia finds itself in a situation in which it must recognize the accession of Kosovo. This group believes that Serbia must not allow the EU to demand a "peaceful recognition" of Kosovo. The main problem of this part of the elite is, however, lack of a clear exit strategy. It does not have a plan about what will happen if it achieves its goal.

Serbia has today a new pro-EU govern- ment, a majority of its population is in favor of European integrations, but if Brussels and Washington pursue the policy of supporting Kosovo's secession and freezing Serbia into recognizing it, it should be no surprise if "EURO-SKEPTICISM" becomes a dominant feeling.

Slobodan Antonijevic is an associate professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade.

The Kosovo Compromise Project

The Serbian foreign policy, which was never openly opposed Serbia's entry into the EU – until this last culmination of the post-Milosevic authorities. By doing this, the Serbian political life seemed to us that a thousand-year golden era of peace and prosperity with a head of democratic Serbia would stand shoulder to shoulder with its Western friends and would be united in marching towards a brighter future.

But it did not turn out that way. Although Serbs extruded to the Hague two of its presidents, a prime minister, a bunch of ministers, and the entire wartime chief of state, it was still unable to do anything but "fighting tooth and nail" with the "inside" and at the result, cannot even make the antechamber of the Euro-Atlantic Union.
“Europe had made great mistakes in the Balkans. The question is: how is it possible that such an important principle as territorial integrity can be ignored?”

- Carlos Papoulias, President of the Republic of Greece

“We consider Kosovo as a dangerous and unfortunate precedent. Europe will pay for it for decades. It’s obvious that a whole host of other separatist regimes will exploit it to justify their own desire for legal status.”

- Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation

“Romania supports only those tasks which are based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and do not in any sense imply recognition of Kosovo.”

- Traian Basescu, President of the Republic of Romania

“The question of status of Kosovo must be solved in line with the norms of international law, with the leading role of the United Nations, and based on an agreement of the sides. . The unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo is against UN Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, which - until a new decision by this organization is made - must remain the legal basis for the resolution of the Kosovo problem. Russia, India and China call for the resumption of talks between Belgrade and Pristina under the framework of international laws to seek a solution for the Serbian territory.”

- Joint statement by Russia, China and India

“I pledged that the United States will continue to work with those nations that have not recognized an independent Kosovo in order to convince them to do so as quickly as possible.”

- George W. Bush, President of the United States of America

“We do not have the intention, nor will have it in a foreseeable future to recognize Kosovo.”

- Vatican Cardinal, Valter Casper

“The unilateral declaration of the independence of a part of the Serbian state and the recognition of that secession, are contrary to the norms and principles of international law: state sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.”

- Resolution adopted by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) in Tokyo

“And the question that we should now address to the USA and the European Union is the following: What would you say, you who have recognized the independence of a region of Serbia - a region without national flag or anthem, without historical tradition as a nation - if we, Catalonians, were to declare independence? We DO have a historical tradition, we have the oldest national anthem in Europe; we have an ancient national flag, our own language and culture. Would you support us in the same way you supported Kosovo?”

- Xavier Hereu, El Periodico

“Five months after the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo Albanians on February 17th, the situation in this formerly Serbian province resembles every day more to a frozen conflict, an embarrassment to the European Union which is trying to save the face of its foreign and security policy.”

- Christophe Chatelot, Le Monde

“A large number of states have not recognized it, and that means that Spain must avoid walking on razor’s edge and keep in Kosovo a mission that is contrary to the UN law.”

- Beatriz Rodriguez-Salmones, Member of Parliament, Spain

“Courts in Kosovo frequently failed to take into account ethnically motivated factors, which were the cause of many of the crimes. Suspects convicted of serious crimes, such as setting alight religious monuments or injuring people, including policemen, often received lenient sentences, many of which were suspended.”

- Report of the OSCE

“Kosovo has a problematic human rights record. Violence, impunity for common crimes and political crimes, intimidation and discrimination are commonplace. If that is to change, Kosovo’s government, with the help of the United States and its EU partners, must make human rights a top priority.”

- Human Rights Watch

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- Tony Barber, The Financial Times

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- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

“Another fine mess in Kosovo. . For weeks it has been an uncomfortable secret in Brussels that the European Union’s law and order mission in Kosovo is stuck in a political, diplomatic and legal morass… You can safely add Kosovo to your list of long-term trouble spots on the EU’s periphery.”

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“Kosovo will be largely dependent on EU aid, and in the meantime nobody knows if the new entity is really viable, or if it is going to be a ‘failed state’ whose economy will go on being largely based on corruption and organized crime.”

- John Barry, The Times

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