Kosovo in the Geopolitical Context

Until the set date the diplomats taking part in the negotiations have agreed to work jointly in the regime of "the shuttle diplomacy" in an attempt to "launch" direct Serbian-Albanian negotiations. The diplomats involved include Aleksandr Botzan-Kharchenko, Russia's Foreign Minister's special envoy, Frank Vizner, Washington's special envoy on the issues of the Kosovo settlement and Wolfgang Ischinger, a German diplomat, representing the EU.

It has turned out, however, that it was too early for the supporters of respect of international law and the search for a political solution to the historically complicated Kosovo problem to free their minds of anxiety. The setting up of the middleman "Group of Three" is a Western ploy aimed at pacifying the public opinion and making Russia one of the members of the group responsible for anti-lawful activities. Acting behind Russia's back, the United States and the EU got the chance of "pushing" the issue of independence for their Kosovo Albanian siblings, with an emphasis on the fat that in either the "group of three" nor in the Contact group Moscow has no right of veto.

The touch-stone of the final stage of the realisation of the Western Kosovo strategy was Herr Ischinger's statement on the blueprint of the division of the province. The timing was perfect, as it all happened August 12,2007, the final day of the presence of "Group of Three" at the Balkans, but at the moment when Russia's representative Aleksandr Botzan-Kharcheko had already left Pristina. The protocol proceedings envisaged the appearance of all the three diplomats at a news conference, when they looked like a team of same-minded people. The most interesting things began to happen afterwards, when the EU representative organised his personal appearance before the press, stating that the "Group of Three" agreed to the division of Kosovo provided both Serbians and Croats find the idea fit.

The fact that the situation was in a blind alley was clear right from the start. Both the Contact group, and Pristina and Belgrade flatly denied the idea of division. But what was the most important thing for Brussels was to make a psychological effect, which worked. The Albanian-language Kosovo media and respected European publications began to discuss the idea of division, while the EU succeeded in positioning itself as a body sincerely interested in unblocking the situation, for which it was allegedly coming up with "fresh" solutions.

Having fully enjoyed the effect Herr Ischinger had produced, the NATO-EU circles disavowed his scandalous statement. The German diplomat stated that his words were "misinterpreted" as he was only expecting new non-standard moves from Prisitna and Belgrade, after which he se out on a new two-day visit to Kosovo, this time alone, in the absence of the company of his Russian and U.S. colleagues. The programme of his private talks with leaders of Albanian separatists included no meetings with the press. Ishinger paid most of his attention to the secret meeting with the leader of the opposition Kosovo Democratic Party (KDP) and the former political leader of the terrorist "Kosovo Liberation Army" Hasim Taci. According to the results of November-slated elections to the Kosovo Assembly the KDP is standing a real chance of getting the power. So after his talks the EU special envoy wasted no time in announcing that he was "tuning his watch" to that of the potential would-be president of the "Kosovo Republic".

The flattered Taci also made a point of making a remark at the discussion of the results of the discussion that he had found the arrival of Herr Ischinger "very positive and important for the process we all are involved in." As for Agim Ceku, the current head of the Kosovo government (also doubling as the KLA ex-Commander-in-Chief) explained the gist of the talks with Ishinger in a rough military style, saying: "It is all about us using the time allotted for the negotiations in a positive and constructive manner, focusing our attempts on the building of good neighbourly relations between the two countries, Kosovo and Serbia." The third member of the formally united "Group", the United States, expressed its master's blessing of the separatist activities of Herr Ishinger. The U.S. envoy to the UN Zalmay Halilzad, a former US Ambassador to Baghdad and a politician close to the circle of president George W.Bush in an interview to the Viennese newspaper Presse on August 27 said that a solution to the problem of the Kosovo status can be found even without Russia."

What can follow is seen in the following way. Ischinger and Vizner will make attempts to create the visibility of collegiality in the activities of the "Group of Three", in reality encouraging the Albanian separatists in Kosovo to hold tight. The acute response to the idea of disintegration of Kosovo would be just another proof of the absence of an alternative to the idea of the province's independence. The International Crisis Group that has traditionally been the think-tank of Euro Atlantic organisations. The body has already appealed to the EU asking the union to avoid playing with fire while engaged in the process of separations and divisions, rather acting as a "collective defender of Kosovo's total independence" should the parties involved fail to have come to an agreement by December 10, 2007. Former US Ambassador to Belgrade William Montgomery said as much, suggesting that a "coalition of the countries of goodwill" should be established to recognise Kosovo's independence unilaterally, whereas traditionally Serbia and Russia behind its back would be traditionally held responsible for everything that happens.

What should Moscow do under the circumstances? First, it should not give up its demand to look for a compromise solution concerning the Kosovo status. Second, to continue blocking the draft UN Security Council the resolution on the province's independence or its division in disregard of Belgrade's opinion, thus forcing the "coalition" of the supporters of the Albanian separatists to act of their own accord. By the time the United States and the EU countries have decided to unilaterally recognise Kosovo's independence (mid-December of 2007) Russia should form its own coalition of goodwill nations, and the Russian answer to the recognition by the West of unilateral self-determination of Kosovo should be a refusal to continue acting within the framework of the current inefficient formats of settlements of the conflicts in the Trans-Dniester Republic, Abkhazia, South Ossetia (and, according to some experts in Nagorno Karabakh) and the official recognition by Russia and its allies of the sovereignty of the self-proclaimed republics of the former USSR.

The situation on the Eurasian space would not be de-stabilized after that, as nether Georgia, nor Moldavia or Azerbaijan would go into war with Russia, and they do not have resources for the re-integration of former Soviet autonomous republics. The EU would face the presence of a never-healing Kosovo wound close to its frontiers. The US would be forced to acknowledge a tangible failure of its posy-Soviet space strategy. And Russia would confirm its historic mission of a collector nation for Christian peoples and the defender of all those harassed and oppressed.